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Introduction
In 2005 and 2006, anti-neoliberal coalitions won the elections in Bolivia
and Ecuador, respectively. In both countries, this development put an
end to the rules that had regulated the use of natural resources in
hydrocarbon extraction during the latter part of the twentieth century
(Hogenboom, 2014). The post-neoliberal governments constructed new
institutions for the governance of extractive-industry activities. The new
rules of the game have changed the way in which the Andean countries
govern extractive industries. It has not put an end to their dependence
on income generated from natural resources, but it has changed the way
in which that income is distributed.
The process of change from neoliberalism to post-neoliberalism was
fast, and fraught with confusion and abandoned experiments. This
chapter describes that process. Two analytical objectives guide this
description. First, I will identify the factors that guided the changes from
neoliberalism to post-neoliberalism; and second, I will analyse the pos-
sibilities for the governance of mineral and hydrocarbon wealth and the
creation of a “government of nature” that were opened up by the new
regulatory framework.
Natural resources, rentier states, development
and post-neoliberalism
The contemporary debate about development based on natural
resources has existed since the 1990s. Numerous academic studies con-
ducted in that decade called attention to the relationship between
113
F. de Castro et al. (eds.), Environmental Governance in Latin America
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2016
114 The Government of Nature
income from natural resources and development, highlighting the neg-
ative impact of the former on the latter. In this century, however, the
ﬁndings of those pioneering studies have been disputed by a growing
body of literature primarily focused on political economy (Sachs and
Warner, 1995; Karl, 2007; Whatchenkon, 1999; Auty and Gebb, 2001;
Ross, 2001; Robinson, Tovik and Verdier, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson,
2012).
The thesis of the “natural resources curse” questioned the policies
advanced by international ﬁnancial institutions and transnational com-
panies. These stakeholders argued that the developing countries in
the process of development could exploit their comparative advan-
tages in the ﬁeld of natural resources to accelerate their development
(Bebbington et al., 2008). The neoliberal governments of the 1990s
adopted this thesis. Critical studies developed in recent decades have
examined the economic and social effects of those policies, stressing the
effects of the rents from natural resources on the political and economic
development of countries with an abundance of these resources.
The consequent debate failed to resolve the issue in the ﬁeld of
resource economics (Iimi, 2007; Collier, 2010), but not in the ﬁeld of
political institutions. In fact, political scientists and political economists
who specialize in development have shown that an economy based on
the extraction of natural resources actually has a negative impact on
the development of political institutions that manage the appropriation
and use of state income for these extractive activities (Bebbington et al.,
2008; Collier, 2010). This adverse effect is mediated by a speciﬁcally
political variable: the adoption of a rentier model of natural resource
governance by the governmental decision-makers. The policy of the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and transnational companies
would instigate the governments of the developing countries to adopt
some type of regulatory institution that would – in the medium and
short term – guide the evolution towards a rentier state and very proba-
bly towards the creation of the conditions that produce an effect known
as the “natural resource curse” (Bebbington et al., 2008).
Some Latin American scholars have criticized the idea of develop-
ment based on natural resources in the thesis known as the “extractivist
model”: to the negative impacts of income from natural resources would
have to be added two speciﬁcally Latin American effects. On the one
hand, resource-based growth would have impeded the Latin American
countries from earning great international autonomy. On the other
hand, extractivist revenues would have induced the formation of a state
that, in addition to being rentier, was also predatory by nature. This
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effect would be especially serious since that predation occurs in areas
inhabited by indigenous peoples, thereby affecting particularly fragile
ecosystems. Both effects thus imply a predatory and dependent capital-
ist social trajectory (Acosta, 2003; Acosta and Schuldt, 2009; Gudynas,
2012, 2009).
In recent years, various scholars have criticized the negative consen-
sus on resource-based development. The criticisms have been focused on
two major areas. First, the simple relationship between the abundance
of natural resources and poor development does not hold. The evidence
of countries rich in natural resources shows that – under certain condi-
tions – they could achieve high income levels, relative equality, and a
great degree of economic diversiﬁcation, and that they are democracies.
More importantly, these achievements have occurred among developed
countries (Canada, the USA, the UK, Australia, Norway) as well as emerg-
ing countries (Brazil, Chile, South Africa, Indonesia) and developing
countries (Botswana is typically the most cited example, but increasingly
Bolivia and Ecuador are mentioned as well) (Dunning, 2008; Gylfason,
2012; Hujo, 2012; Thorp et al., 2012).
The second area of criticism has to do with the double directionality of
the effects of rents from natural resources. A boom of natural resources
can have a favourable effect on authoritarianism or on democracy; it can
augment the interest of predatory elites who are in control of the state
to preserve their control over the distribution of income (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2010); and it can simultaneously mitigate the redistribution
of private income, thus increasing the appeal of democracy (Dunning,
2008). Similarly, it is possible that a natural resource boom would elevate
the costs of economic diversiﬁcation, but an active state could pay those
costs from the tax revenue that it obtains from natural resource income
(Bebbington, 2012; Thorp, 2012). By investing those ﬁscal resources
in institutions that promote coordination between emerging economic
sectors and the accumulation of human capital, the state would favour
economic diversiﬁcation (Dietsche, 2012; Ascher, 2012; Guajardo, 2012;
Orihuela and Thorp, 2012).
This controversy can be resolved by distinguishing the rentier states
from other types of state (Dunning, 2008). The key variable is not the
abundance of resources but rather the abundance of rents that pro-
duces effects on the states. The exploitation of mineral resources, oil
and gas generates revenues for the states and, given certain conditions,
can transform them into rentier states. Why does this happen?
Rentier states support themselves on a set of regulations that gov-
ern the extractive industries. These rules determine the conditions of
116 The Government of Nature
access to natural resources: how and how much of the proﬁts obtained
by extractive industries will be appropriated by the states; and who inter-
venes in the key decisions to authorize extractive activities and in the
decisions corresponding to the distribution of income. This set of rules
constitutes the core of natural resource governance.
Recent discussions have stressed the point that the distribution of
income is the primary source of conﬂict and debate in rentier states.
In particular, the literature asserts that such income may be used by
governments in two ways. It can lead to a concentration of economic
and political power in the hands of the elite. On the other hand, govern-
ments can also choose to use the revenues to reduce dependence on nat-
ural resources, diversify the economy, and provide beneﬁt to the major-
ity of its citizens. Bebbington (2012) has indicated that, in the study
of development in the Andes, special consideration should be given to
conﬂicts surrounding the extractive industries since they “have great
signiﬁcance for national and subnational political economic change”.
On the other hand, Gylfasson (2010) has argued that the investment
of mineral incomes in social development is an integral strategy of eco-
nomic growth. In particular, he states that “the level and composition
of government expenditure should make a difference for growth”.
Taking advantage of studies advanced by ecological economics and
political ecology, social movements, environmental organizations, and
intellectuals from Latin America as well as from outside the region have
looked at the extraction of natural resources as something more than
just development. The common element in these diverse perspectives
is that they value the sustainability of ecosystems and society in a way
that is entirely different from the utilitarianism inherent in mainstream
economic thought (Nelson, 1995).
A second common element is the double criticism of neoliberal cap-
italism and the idea of development itself (e.g. Acosta, 2003; Gudynas,
2009; Alimonda, 2011; Escobar, 2011). The main thesis of this criticism
is that the expansion of capitalism constantly requires new sources of
natural resources, whose exploitation exclusively beneﬁts industrialized
countries, and in the short and medium term it generates an “illusion
of development” in Latin American countries. This illusion is character-
ized by cycles of rapid economic growth, with partial and fragmented
modernization of societies. These cycles are illusory to the extent that
they have historically proved to be unsustainable over time. The cyclical
behaviour produces great costs for societies, particularly the destruction
of highly diverse ecosystems and the destruction of human populations
whose way of life has been radically altered by the presence of extractive
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activities. These costs tend to crystallize in the political organization of
Latin American societies, which aims to preserve and enhance social
inequality and to keep the rural poor and indigenous populations out of
political decisions.
The Latin American literature is very closely related to the argu-
ments advanced by European and Anglo-Saxon ecological economists
and ecological sociologists. The ﬁrst have shown that the economic
growth experienced by Latin American countries during natural resource
booms has only been achieved on the basis of an unequal exchange
of material ﬂow (Vallejo, 2009; Martínez-Alier et al., 2010; Muradian
et al., 2012). Similarly, Muradian et al. (2012) have noted that recent
technological innovations in the extractive industries have made the
exploitation of mineral and hydrocarbon deposits – located in remote
areas inhabited by indigenous peoples (the Ecuadorian and Bolivian
Amazon, for example) – economically proﬁtable. The expansion of the
“extractive frontier” implies the accelerated destruction of ecosystems
that are essential for planetary survival, along with an increase in
socioenvironmental conﬂicts that put the cohesion of Latin American,
and especially Andean, societies at risk.
Environmentalist literature has made visible two innate elements of
the rentier basis of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian states. First, the con-
struction of rentier states represents a set of enormous environmental
and social costs that are not only ignored by the literature of political
economy and development economics but are also actively kept out of
public discussion by academics, international ﬁnancial institutions and
the governments that have controlled these states. Second, the set of
rules that govern the extractive industries in the rentier states is insuf-
ﬁcient to achieve the objective of an environmental governance that
ensures the sustainability of societies.
The set of debates that I have outlined allows me to present the
central argument of this chapter in order to display and analyse in
the next section the evidence offered by Bolivia and Ecuador on what
I have called “post-neoliberal environmental governance”. Analytically,
post-neoliberal environmental governance in Bolivia and Ecuador – and
possibly in other Latin American rentier states – can be understood as
a system of three layers. In the centre would be the rules of natural
resources governance. These are the rules that govern the extraction of
resources and the production of revenues for the states. At this level the
number of actors is minimal since it only includes governmental elites,
certain state agencies and the companies (public and/or private) that
conduct mining activities.
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A second layer would consist of the rules that govern the distribu-
tion of income, particularly that which is intended to be some type of
compensation for populations especially affected by extractive activities.
It also includes rules that establish monitoring capabilities for the envi-
ronmental damage caused by extractive activities and the organizational
responsibility for such damage. This layer includes high-level policy-
makers and specialized state agencies – just as in the previous level –
but also other stakeholders such as organized citizen groups and pro-
fessional experts who act as consultants for the assessment, monitoring
and determination of environmental damage (van Dijck, 2014).
Finally, the third layer would contain the general way in which the
relationships between the state, society and nature (or environment)
are regulated. Besides being the least formalized of all the layers, it is
also that which supports the greatest number of actors, and is espe-
cially open to the participation of citizens who, for whatever reason,
have some interest in the decisions to be adopted about nature and
the use of resources in their society. Therefore this is the level where
organizations of environmental activists, specialized citizen groups (e.g.
academic communities) and other groups are active.
Bolivia and Ecuador: From the reconﬁguration
of rent-seeking to environmental governance
In order to function, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian states depend on the
ﬂow of rents to their treasuries. Both states capture this income directly
from the activity of extractive industries of minerals and hydrocarbons,
and these rents substitute other sources that are more politically expen-
sive to obtain (e.g. taxes). Thanks to these rents, the states can carry out
distributive policies that are less expensive than their alternatives (e.g.
urban or rural property reforms). These characteristics interact to pro-
duce an overall effect of acceptance of the government in power and
more generally of the state.
Beginning in the years from 2000 to 2002, approximately, Bolivia
and Ecuador have regained signiﬁcant economic growth rates; and this
growth has been accompanied by signiﬁcant reductions in poverty and
inequality.1 These trends are due to three main factors. First is the
increase in world-market prices of the oil, gas and minerals exported by
both countries.2 Second, the Andean states have recovered their ability
to capture the rents produced by the exploitation of natural resources.
Third, the governments have invested in improving the state capacity to
manage the rents, orienting them towards the broad distribution of the
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beneﬁts of economic growth, and – to a lesser extent – trying to induce
a change in the relationships between the rentier sector and the produc-
tion of their economies. These trends are interdependent and mutually
reinforcing.3 The Bolivian and Ecuadorian states have improved their
distributive capacities and therefore have contributed to improving the
quality of life of their populations – especially the poorest – because
they have the ﬁscal resources captured from extractive industry activ-
ities (Paredes, 2012). At the same time, the increased capacity of the
Bolivian and Ecuadorian states to capture rents from natural resources
has improved their tax bases.
The current situation in Bolivia and Ecuador contrasts sharply with
that which dominated in the last decades of the twentieth century.4
During that time, both states signiﬁcantly reduced their capacities to
provide social services to the poor populations, such as health, educa-
tion and money transfers. Low international prices of natural resources
and the inability of the governments to increase state revenues pre-
vented states from implementing distributive policies. Therefore, in the
1980s and 1990s, Bolivia and Ecuador experienced a continued deteri-
oration of the living conditions of the population, increased poverty –
particularly in rural areas – and growing inequality (Lefeber, 2003).
The current natural resources boom is not, however, the cause of the
formation of Bolivia and Ecuador as rentier states but rather only of
its reactivation and reconﬁguration. The Revolution of 1952, in Bolivia,
and the oil boom of the 1970s – for both countries – were key events
that shaped the current rentier states, as will be discussed below.
Bolivia
During the boom period of tin (1910–1954) and before the national-
ization of the mines in 1952, “the State’s attempts to capture more
rent . . . implied a substantial redistributive dynamic . . . any capture of
rent by the State for purposes of greater public spending would tend
to redistribute income from the tin oligarchy to . . . the rest of the pop-
ulation” (Dunning, 2008: 235). In simpliﬁed terms, the pressure of the
social groups excluded from mining revenues – particularly tin workers
and reformist intellectual groups – generated attempts by the govern-
ments to capture mining revenues, which were answered by the mining
oligarchy with coups d’état and repression. The state wanted to be
rentier, but the property ownership and the economic and political
power of the mining elite would not allow it. The Bolivian adminis-
trations during those years had a single resource to expand its ﬁscal
base: to increase taxes on the non-mining sector of the economy,
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which increased the discontent of the non-mining classes. Finally, this
dynamic exploded with the Revolution of 1952.
The capture of the state by the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement
(Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)) and the Bolivian
Workers’ Union (Central Obrera Boliviana (COB)) in 1952 led to the
nationalization of the mines in October of that same year and the forma-
tion of the state company Mining Corporation of Bolivia (Corporación
Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL)) (Paredes, 2012). Thanks to this direct
control over mineral income, the mines became the main source of state
income and the fuel for public spending in the rest of the economy.
Between 1952 and 1964, when a military coup d’état put an end to the
revolution, the Bolivian state used mining income to moderate the dis-
tributive conﬂict, to invest in the development of other sectors of the
economy – particularly the manufacturing sector and the growth of the
agricultural sector of eastern Bolivia – and to create a national citizen-
ship (Klein, 2008; Soruco, 2010; Crabtree and Crabtree-Condor, 2012).
However, domestic and international economic factors – primarily the
prolonged and severe decline in the price of tin – conspired against this
ﬁrst attempt at the conﬁguration of the Bolivian rentier state.
The decisive factor for the conﬁguration of the current rentier state
came with the oil boom of the 1970s. The administration of Hugo
Bánzer approved a Hydrocarbon Law in 1972 that allowed for the open-
ing of oil concessions, thus establishing new ways of capturing income.
Oil exploitation throughout the 1970s expanded exponentially: in 1974,
oil revenues allowed the state to balance its accounts, and in 1978, oil
and natural gas exports represented 30% of Bolivian exports (Miranda,
2008). As Dunning notes, “by the end of the 1970s Bolivia had clearly
witnessed an oil boom that . . . exerted a substantial impact on the coffers
of the ﬁsc” (Dunning, 2008: 244).
Although oil production and oil prices on the world market declined
in the 1980s, oil revenues increased their share in the state treasury.
In effect, the administration of Jaime Paz Zamora obligated the YPFB
(Yacimientos Petroleros Fiscales de Bolivia) by law to transfer an increas-
ing portion of its income to the central government, amounting to 60%
of state revenues. In the 1990s the dependency of oil revenues tended to
decline. This development initiated the neoliberal phase of the Bolivian
state.
Confronted with serious macroeconomic imbalances, the government
of Víctor Paz Estenssoro commissioned the minister of planning at the
time – and future president – Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada to imple-
ment a reform of the oil sector. Inspired by neoliberal ideology, Sánchez
de Losada pushed back the participation of the Bolivian state in oil
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revenues from 50% to 18% (Dunning, 2008). The idea behind these
cuts was to attract foreign investment for the exploration of new oil
ﬁelds and to develop the exploitation of newly discovered deposits
of natural gas. Tax revenues from oil income dropped dramatically,
reaching a low of only 7% of total tax revenues (Dunning, 2008).
On the other hand, although foreign investment actually ﬂowed into
gas exploitation – especially from 1997 onwards – Sánchez de Losada’s
reforms prevented this development from contributing signiﬁcantly to
government revenues. Instead, Latin American companies (Petrobras,
Pluspetrol) and transnational non-Latin American companies (Repsol,
British Gas, Amoco-British Petroleum, Total ELF) beneﬁted mainly from
the exploitation of gas.
The growing opposition of popular sectors and of leftwing politicians
to the effects of capitalization and the increased expectations of gas
as the motor of a renewed national development ﬁnally exploded in
2003 in opposition to the government project of constructing a pipeline
from the East to Chile. The Gas War put an end to the second adminis-
tration of Sánchez de Losada. This led to an end of the political struggle
for the capture of natural resource revenues by the Bolivian state, which
caused a rapid turnover of governments between 2003 and 2005.
The neoliberal experiment of disarming the Bolivian rentier state
came to an end with the election of Evo Morales as president. The
Morales government nationalized the Bolivian oil and gas industry
again in 2006, increasing the state’s share in the income of the sector
to 82%, although the effective participation of the state was stabilized
at 50% of revenues after 2007 (Miranda, 2008). Finally, in 2009, the state
secured its control over non-renewable natural resources in a way that
was favourable to the central government, and to the detriment of the
grievances of the Media Luna departments (Santa Cruz, Tarija, El Beni)
and of the claims of the organized indigenous peoples in the Indige-
nous Native Peasant Territories, where the hydrocarbon deposits were
located (Humphreys-Bebbington, 2012). The importance of these devel-
opments has been widely recognized and disseminated by the Bolivian
Government, which in 2013 stated that the nationalization of hydro-
carbons had “generated more than $5 million USD for redistribution”,
and that YPFB had become “the country’s largest business corporation”
(President of the Republic, 2013).
Ecuador
More so than Bolivia, Ecuador beneﬁted from the boom in oil prices
in the 1970s. Along with the beginning of oil exploitation in the
Ecuadorian Amazon, the military conducted a coup d’état and embraced
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a programme of oil nationalization and development guided by the
state. The military government of General Rodríguez Lara (1972–1976)
explicitly followed a policy of “planting oil”. This consisted of the
investment of ﬁscal oil revenue into infrastructure as well as industry
loans and other policies that sought to diversify the country’s industrial
foundation and to improve its productivity – and that of the agri-
cultural sector. While there is still debate about the achievements of
the Rodríguez Lara government (North, 1985; Conaghan, 1988), there
is a consensus that this administration actually succeeded in institu-
tionalizing a path of development that linked the country’s economic
growth, maintenance and expansion of infrastructure and government
capabilities with the provision of comprehensive tax revenue from oil
exports.
The development towards a rentier state was completed in two phases.
In the ﬁrst phase (1972–1976) a progressive fraction of the military con-
trolled the state and maintained nationalist and inclusive development
policies, although without much support from weak popular sectors.
The second phase (1976–1979) actually halted some of those policies
and instead used oil revenues as collateral to obtain international loans
that were used to pay a bloated state sector, and as a source of cheap
loans channelled into a dominant rentier class (Acosta, 2003; Larrea,
2009; Oleas, 2013). In both instances, tax collection – except those
obtained in customs – practically stopped to the point that, according to
Acosta (2003), “the dictator himself, Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, boasted
decades later that in his government taxes were not collected. Any ﬁs-
cal emergency, when oil revenues were insufﬁcient or declining due to
economic reasons, was covered by foreign loans.”
In 1979 the military gave back the state government to elected civil-
ian governments. The ﬁrst civilian government (1979–1984) partially
resumed the project of the progressive military government, using oil
revenues to postpone adjustments to the economy and to increase social
investment (Oleas, 2013). However, the impact of the international debt
crisis in 1982 and the deterioration of international oil prices tested the
ability of these civilian governments to handle the problems that they
had inherited from the rentier state: a mostly inefﬁcient, oligopolistic
and slow-growing industry, rising urban and rural poverty, and so forth.
The institutions that made the capture of oil revenues possible in
the 1970s remained practically unchanged in the 1980s. Only at the
end of the decade, as a result of a sharp drop in oil prices, did the
Ecuadorian Government make efforts to reduce direct state control over
some elements of the oil industry and to attract foreign investment.
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During the government of Sixto Durán Ballén (1992–1996), a politi-
cian of clearly neoliberal orientation, the state ceded a large part of
its regulatory capacity and economic participation to private compa-
nies, and simultaneously reduced its oversight of mining activities.
In an attempt to attract private transnational companies, state partici-
pation – in the form of royalties – decreased in favour of the creation
of income taxes. In this period there was a systematic increase in
socioenvironmental conﬂicts with indigenous peoples residing in the
Amazon.
Oil revenues improved from 2002 onwards with the opening of new
oil ﬁelds and the construction of a pipeline complementary to that
which was constructed in the 1970s. Acosta described the situation in
2003: “Ecuador will be what it has always been, a primary producer
country. And oil looms as the source of income that will alleviate pres-
sures . . .The wager is how to produce and transport the greatest quantity
of crude oil.” This was a situation that, according to the author, was not
beneﬁcial to the state because the developments of the 1980s and 1990s
had reduced the production capacity of the state oil company. The cap-
ture of oil rents by the state had decreased signiﬁcantly (from 80% in
the late 1970s to 18% at the beginning of the 2000s).
This bleak picture changed dramatically with the election of the cur-
rent president, Rafael Correa, in 2006 (re-elected in 2009 and 2013).
Armed with overwhelming electoral support, the new administration
resuscitated the 1970s scheme of controlling oil revenues: he cancelled
existing contracts, returned most of the concessions to the state, obliged
companies to cede most of their income to the state, and strengthened
the state oil company. All of these changes occurred just in time for
the boom in international oil prices of recent years (Ray and Kozameh,
2012).
The reconﬁguration of what I have named “the core of post-neoliberal
environmental governance” in Bolivia and Ecuador happened within
the institutional patterns established in the 1970s evolution towards
rentier states. The current boom revives the countries’ historical her-
itage, as shown in Table 4.1.
Endowed with abundant ﬁscal resources, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian
governments have managed to distribute income by investing in social
policies that seek to improve the living conditions of citizens, and to
undertake ambitious programmes of industrialization and technological
innovation (SENPLADES, 2013; Agenda Bolivia 2025, 2013). This aspect
corresponds with the component of income distribution and it can be
explained by two factors. First, in both countries the struggle for control
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Table 4.1 Income capture in Bolivia and Ecuador
Mechanism of income capture Bolivia Ecuador
Royalties 18% 13.5%
Proﬁt and export taxes 69.5% 60%
Total share of income 87.5% 73.5%
Non-taxed mechanisms YPFB PETROECUADOR
Source: UNASUR (2013), prepared by the author.
of the rentier state was resolved in the second half of 2000 in favour of
rival political elites from the traditional oligarchies who had controlled
their respective states during the 1980s and 1990s. Second, the pressure
for a better distribution of wealth that developed in those years came
from organized popular sectors, including rural groups affected by the
exploitation of natural resources.
In short, political developments in previous years pushed for an
income distribution different from that which predominated in the
years of neoliberalism. However, since these developments incorpo-
rated new demands, they led to increased attention by the Bolivian and
Ecuadorian governments to the themes relegated to the resource agenda
that prevailed in the last quarter of the twentieth century, particularly
the environmental costs of the extractive industries.
The current Bolivian and Ecuadorian governments originate from het-
erogeneous coalitions in middle-class and popular urban sectors, and –
more in the case of Bolivia than Ecuador – rural sectors. Silva (2009) dis-
tinguishes two forms of inclusion of the popular sectors. On one hand,
the ruling party in Bolivia – Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) – achieves
the direct incorporation of popular sectors into the state government
in the form of a classic party of the masses. Furthermore, the ruling
party in Ecuador – Alianza País – is an electoral machine that had a
strong mobilization, and participation of indigenous and peasant orga-
nizations, social movements with environmental roots, and NGOs from
2006 to 2009 (Becker, 2011; Andrade, 2012; Ortíz, 2013; Silva, 2013).
The difference between the origins and mechanisms of the incorpora-
tion of the governments is important. In Bolivia, the social support of
the organized indigenous and peasants is key for the survival of the gov-
ernment. This factor has signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the discourse – strongly
tinged by indigenous Bolivian ideology – and the way in which the
project of Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir is conﬁgured. In Ecuador, the indigenous
have maintained a tense relationship with the government of President
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Correa as well as a progressive distancing from environmental organiza-
tions since 2010. This item is also reﬂected in the discourse of Buen Vivir
(Dominguez and Caria, 2013).
One would expect, given these differences, that the policies of the two
governments with respect to the economy–society–nature relationship
would also be distinct. A government with high indigenous participa-
tion should have a policy that is more pro-environment than one with
low participation; however, this is not the case. In fact, if a difference
exists between Bolivia and Ecuador, it is in the degree of translation
of environmental concerns into specialized state agencies. The strange
thing is that, contrary to the prediction by indigenous theorists, the
degree of incorporation of the environmental issue in Ecuador is higher
than in Bolivia.
Environmental compensations and claims
Political sociological studies of the state administration (or manage-
ment) of the environment have shown that it is composed of the
following elements: a network of actors who operate – within and out-
side the state – around problems deﬁned as “environmental”; certain
professionals who deﬁne the situation and develop solutions to prob-
lems; institutional rules of the political process of decision-making; and
the cultural ideas that legitimate these decisions (Lahusen and Münch,
2001). I have suggested that in Bolivia and Ecuador the core of resource
governance consists of a strict set of governmental actors, namely, spe-
cialized ministers and state companies. Institutional rules in this core
are highly formalized in their respective constitutions (state ownership
of oil, gas and minerals being the basic rule). The relevant professions
are basically administration, geology and – to a lesser extent – a diverse
set of “environmental consultants”. Finally, the cultural ideas that legiti-
mate decisions are fairly simply: oil, gas and minerals are resources to be
exploited for the beneﬁt of national development (SENPLADES, 2013;
Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living
Well O431 Ofﬁcial Gazette, 2012; Agenda Bolivia 2025, 2013).
Outside this nucleus, both Bolivia and Ecuador have ministries of the
environment (the Ministry of Environment of Ecuador (MAE) and the
Ministry of Environment and Water in Bolivia (MAyA)), departments
and other state agencies that integrate a diverse network of profession-
als. Also, in both cases, ﬁnal decisions are taken by the government.
The principles that structure the cultural ideas of this sector are precau-
tion, the need to restore environmental damage; the prevention of such
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damages; and the concern for ensuring sustainability. The diagnosis of
environmental problems includes, in both cases – and even more clearly
in Ecuador – checking for damages caused by oil activities, such as defor-
estation, soil and water pollution, and loss of biodiversity and cultural
diversity.
The solution to the detected problems is also common. In Ecuador,
environmental governance is deﬁned as the realization of the “citi-
zen’s right to live in a healthy environment, free of pollution and
sustainable, and the guarantee of the rights of nature through compre-
hensive planning to manage habitats, to manage resources efﬁciently, to
holistically repair and return life systems to real harmony with nature”
(SENPLADES, 2013: 222). The Bolivian Government afﬁrms that it has
an obligation to “create the conditions to ensure the sustainability of
the State itself in all its territorial areas in order to attain the stan-
dards of Living Well . . . to incorporate integral development in harmony
and balance with Mother Earth in order to Live Well in the policies,
rules, strategies, plans, programmes and projects at the central level
of the State and of the autonomous territorial entities . . . to formulate,
implement, monitor and evaluate policies, standards, strategies, plans,
programmes and projects for the compliance of the objects, targets and
indicators of Living Well, through integral development . . . ” (Gaceta
Oﬁcial, 2012: 12).
In both countries, and as the culmination of long historical evolu-
tions of the twentieth century (Baud and Ospina, 2013), the respective
ministries of the environment administer “systems of environmental
management”. Key components of these systems are national parks
and ecological reserves. In Ecuador the National System of Protected
Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (SNAP)) comprises the
State Heritage of National Areas (Patrimonio de Áreas Naturales del
Estado (PANE)) – managed by the central government – and three other
“subsystems” to make room for the participation of subnational gov-
ernments, organized local communities and the private sector: “the
Autonomous Decentralised Governments, the Subsystem of Protected
Community Areas and the Subsystem of Private Protected Areas”.
Together these areas of conservation and protection comprise nearly
8 million Ha of the country.
The Bolivian Government, meanwhile, has organized a complex insti-
tutional framework that grants powers to the Public Ministry, the
Ombudsman of Mother Earth, the Agro-environmental Court, the Min-
istry of Environment, and the Plurinational Council for Living Well in
Harmony and Balance with Mother Earth. It integrates the ministry
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of Developmental Planning (the Bolivian equivalent to the Secretaría
Nacional de Planiﬁcación y Desarrollo/National Secretary for Planning
and Development (SENPLADES)), the Autonomous Departmental Gov-
ernments and so forth. This organization multiplies the actors and entry
points in environmental issues. As in Ecuador, the basic component of
this system is the National System of Protected Areas (Sistema Nacional
de Áreas Protegidas (SERNAP)). The Plurinational Council is directly
hinged to the presidency of the Republic.
Another important environmental agenda of the two countries is cli-
mate change. The respective ministries and other state agencies have
created plans for adaptation to and mitigation of climate change. The
development of this theme, and of the environmental agencies overall,
has relied heavily on international cooperation. Prominent interna-
tional actors, who are common to both countries, are the World Bank,
UNEP and the ofﬁcial German cooperation.
Finally, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian governments agree that the rich
biodiversity of the two countries provides opportunities for some kind
of “green” development, and they have advanced policies in this direc-
tion. Since 2001, Ecuador has been developing a National Program of
Bio-knowledge, whose management depends on the ministries of envi-
ronment and agriculture under the National Biosafety Framework (MAE,
2013; Andrade and Zenteno, 2014). In Bolivia the “Framework Law . . . ”
and the “Bolivia Agenda, 2025” contemplate a similar development, but
the government has not made progress in the implementation of these
policies.
As indicated above, the Ecuadorian environmental policy differs from
that of Bolivia in the importance that it gives to the environmental dam-
age caused by oil exploitation. Since 2008 the Ecuador’s government
has promoted an active policy of environmental remediation, exe-
cuted by the Reparation Program of Environmental and Social Liabilities
(Programa de Reparación de Pasivos Ambientales y Sociales (PRAS)).
The notion of “shared responsibility” – between the state and local
communities in the management of environmental problems that pre-
vail in institutional environmental designs – opens up opportunities
for the participation of local communities and municipal, provin-
cial and (in Bolivia) departmental governments. The role of scientiﬁc
knowledge in this layer of environmental governance is important.
Agencies generate and require scientiﬁc knowledge for the installation of
environmental indicator systems, environmental accounts, early detec-
tion of environmental damage and so on. This necessity has created
state organizations populated by local experts – specialized in public
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administration and in certain branches of knowledge, such as biol-
ogy and geography – and scientists mostly of international origin or
trained in ﬁrst-world universities (Andrade and Zenteno, 2014, http://
www.conocimiento.gob.ec).
Although the Bolivian Government shares this point of view to a
great extent, it gives senior ranking to the generation of knowledge and
technology to add value to “food processing, lithium, gas and hydro-
carbons . . . ” (Agenda Bolivia 2025, 2013). In fact, the sixth objective of
the development of the Bolivian Government’s agenda indicates that
such technological advances will be accompanied by an increase in
hydrocarbon and metallic and non-metallic minerals. The incorpora-
tion of technology refers not only to processes of industrialization but
also to minimizing environmental damage.
In summary, this level of post-neoliberal environmental governance –
summarized in Table 4.2 – incorporates not only a range of actors but
also well-established international actors and issues of the global envi-
ronmental agenda (deforestation, environmental remediation, envi-
ronmental services, climate change, etc.). The latter should not be
surprising given that the state agencies that organize the sector origi-
nated precisely from pressures and institutional global designs, or they
at least count on international cooperation for their operation. Environ-
mental administration is focused on environmental management, and
its basic attention is devoted to widely accepted global issues – defor-
estation, the preservation and administration of water resources, the
remediation of various forms of environmental pollution, and increas-
ingly climate change – and its function is to produce public policies
on these issues. Its fundamental political component is the adminis-
tration of national and international resources for the reproduction of
environmental management.
There remains to be examined the third layer. Unlike the previous two
layers, which are directly hinged to the state, this last one is the domain
of civil society. Even when it resorts to formal rules, it is mainly infor-
mal and is open to a number of state and non-state actors. This level is
important because, on the one hand, it has provided some of the discur-
sive resources that comprise the environmental rhetoric of the Bolivian
and Ecuadorian governments and, on the other hand, civil actors use
this rhetoric as a resource of political action.
A cursory examination of the rhetoric of “living well” and “good liv-
ing”, in Bolivia and Ecuador, respectively, indicates the constant appeal
to three ideas: harmony with nature, the sacredness of nature (revealed
in the frequent use of names such as Mother Earth and Pachamama), and
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Table 4.2 Environmental administration in Bolivia and Ecuador
Bolivia Ecuador
Formal rules Framework Law Constitution
Agenda Patriótica 2025 National Plan for Living
Well
Speciﬁc laws Speciﬁc laws








Other actors Subnational governments Subnational governments
International cooperation International
cooperation




















Climate change Climate change
the rights of this entity. The Ecuadorian Constitution, both in its pream-
ble and in its Chapter 4, recognizes the right of Ecuadorians to live in
a healthy and balanced environment, in harmony with nature. A simi-
lar phrase appears in Chapter 1, Article 1 of the Bolivian “Framework
Law . . . ” in the form of “comprehensive and balanced development”
and as a guarantee of the “continuity of the regenerative capacity of the
systems and components of Mother Earth”. The “living well” and “good
living” discourses also agree on two other points. First, this state of har-
mony does not exist at the moment, but it will be obtained in the more
or less distant future as a result of social efforts led by the state. Second,
a key component of this company is the respect and use of “ancestral
knowledge” (“originating” in the Bolivian rhetoric) (SENPLADES, 2009,
2013; Domínguez and Caria, 2013).
Regardless of the ideological value that these discourses may have
to legitimate governmental actions, “living well” and “good living”
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have encouraged complaints, protests and demands of indigenous and
environmentalist actors as much in Ecuador as in Bolivia. In effect, the
anti-mining protests in Ecuador in 2012, the staging of anti-mining ref-
erenda in that country (see Chapter 11, this volume) and the failed
Yasuní-ITT initiative articulated the idea that the achievement of “good
living” depended on at least three conditions. These comprised the
preservation of ecological balance, the need for governments to take
into account the voice of those who are possibly affected (van Teijlingen,
2013), and, in the case of Yasuní, the obligation of the Ecuadorian state
to preserve cultures whose ancestral knowledge preserves the rights of
nature (Rival, 2012). In Bolivia the conﬂict over TIPNIS national park
was also articulated and could be processed through the resource of the
“living well” and rights of nature rhetorics (Ortiz, 2013).
Both the Yasuní-ITT initiative and the TIPNIS conﬂicts show some of
the processes, mechanisms, actors, potentials and limits of the “living
well” and “good living” rhetorics. In both cases, policies initiated by
their respective governments tried to protect the rights of the indige-
nous peoples who lived in areas of the Amazon. Similarly, in both
cases these policies implied that the state would abstain from exploit-
ing oil resources in those territories. Finally, when both governments
changed their policies, they incited intense conﬂicts between the exec-
utives and national indigenous and environmentalist groups that had
international support.
In summary, the third layer provides discursive and legal resources
for stakeholders to advance their environmental demands. These actors
are, in principle, any group of citizens; and even those citizens are
not limited to national boundaries as they may be international orga-
nizations. In special circumstances – such as the temporary control of
the state by “green” coalitions – actors, issues and modes of operation
that arise in this sphere can become national and international pub-
lic policies (Sodërbaum, 2000), as happened in Ecuador between 2007
and 2010. In Bolivia this position was occupied by indigenous move-
ment organizations (Hogenboom, 2014). However, when that careful
step contradicts the preservation of the core of natural resource gover-
nance in a rentier state, these same actors and themes are again expelled
to the periphery, as indeed happened with the Yasuní-ITT initiative and
the Bolivian TIPNIS conﬂict. The expulsion depends on how the decisive
power is organized in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian states. In both cases
the standard decisive power falls on the president and state agencies that
are nuclear to the rentier states; this group can veto policies that would
infringe on their reproduction.
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Conclusion
The Bolivian and Ecuadorian experiences show that although new forms
of regulating the exploitation and use (income) of natural resources
can be created, they have prioritized the preservation of the states’
access to income and, by implication, of the extractivist activities them-
selves. This burden differentiates environmental government at various
levels, as long as their existence does not compromise the reproduc-
tion circuit of the rentier state (extraction cycle, income and distri-
bution). Bolivia and Ecuador have abundant natural resources, both
in the narrow sense of mineral resources – oil and gas – and in the
extended sense of ecosystem diversity. Additionally, in both countries
the long-term historical development has been towards the installa-
tion and consolidation of rentier states. The current commodity boom
created room so that governments that might have followed a differ-
ent path opted to recreate the rentier states of the 1970s. The policy
option resulted in the differentiated post-neoliberal mode of environ-
mental governance that is currently being consolidated in the two
countries.
In both countries the original formation of the rentier states depended
both on internal political struggles and the existence of high inter-
national prices for hydrocarbons – and in the case of tin in post-war
Bolivia, the collapse of these international markets. The current reacti-
vation of the rentier states reﬂects factors similar to those of the past:
the boom in mineral exports enabled the Bolivian and Ecuadorian gov-
ernments to reconﬁgure the rent-seeking mechanisms that ensure their
access to the abundant returns produced by extraction and export to
international markets. This development, in turn, increased the abil-
ity of states to provide basic services, and consequently legitimized the
extractive activities supported (and to some extent controlled) by the
states.
The explanation is not only economic. Politics has also played a role
in creating post-neoliberal environmental governance. The Bolivian and
Ecuadorian governments are the result of processes of dispute over the
use of natural resources. The arrival of new players to the control of the
state, and the means by which they attained that power, would seem to
explain the construction of a sort of macroideology with strong environ-
mental tones: “living well” and “good living”. This element completes
the set of environmental governance and gives it ideological coherence.
The regulation of natural resources, including the use of income from
exploitation, makes sense only to the extent that it serves a greater
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purpose: to achieve a new relationship between Bolivian and Ecuadorian
societies and their natural surroundings.
The dynamics of post-neoliberal environmental governance are com-
plex. On the one hand, the rentier status of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian
states promotes the social and biological reproduction of societies and
new attempts at industrialization. On the other hand, rentier states
have an interest in promoting the expansion of resource frontiers,
which compromise fragile ecosystems and the survival of rural societies,
thereby increasing political conﬂicts. However, it is still incipient and
relatively exclusive, and its mechanisms are insufﬁcient to solve the
operation/preservation dilemma. Finally, the open possibilities in the
ideological or cultural layer provide symbolic and material resources for
the expression of socioenvironmental conﬂicts, and some mechanisms
for its processing. However, its implementation depends on the strength
of the democratic regime.
It is reasonable to assume that the tensions, conﬂicts and dynamics
that gave rise to the current mode of environmental governance will
continue to inﬂuence future developments. At the moment, however,
it is difﬁcult to say if at some point in this development it will orga-
nize itself in a more pluralistic and open way than it is at present, or
whether – as in periods of decline in international prices – it will be
reconﬁgured in an increasingly exclusive and unstable direction.
Notes
1. In Bolivia, poverty improved more rapidly than inequality, which actually
seems to be increasing, while in Ecuador the two indicators have decreased
simultaneously and at accelerated rates. A report from the Central Bank of
that country indicates that the accelerated rate is due to two factors: “the
improvement of the international environment” and the degree of destruc-
tion provoked by the crisis of 1998–2002. See Dirección General de Estudios,
Banco Central del Ecuador, La Economía Ecuatoriana luego de 10 años de
Dolarización (The Ecuadorian Economy After 10 Years of Dolarisation) (Quito:
Banco Central del Ecuador).
2. The exportation of minerals is not important for Ecuador, but the high prices
of mineral ores have stimulated the government to promote the develop-
ment, albeit still incipient, of metal mining in Ecuador, for which Chinese
investments have ﬂowed into the country.
3. For an overview of the ﬁnancing of social policy from mineral (or
hydrocarbon) resources, see Hujo, K. (2012).
4. See CEPAL (2013).
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